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TRADE-UNION DEMOCRACY
ALFRED M. OPPENHEIM*
The concepts of "democracy" and "freedom" when ap-
plied to labor unions present the problem of reconciling the
need for authority and for a disciplined membership with
the desire to protect the individual worker's freedom of
judgment and action.' It is the purpose of this paper to
determine whether or not trade-union government has pro-
duced a reconciliation consonant with the spirit of a demo-
cratic society.
Some relativity is attained by recognizing that certain
labor leaders-just as did the Costa brothers in the business
world-have obtained publicity incommensurate with their
true importance. Of course, there are abuses in labor un-
ions. As one writer comments, the power of John L. Lewis
is so encompassing as to make any form of democratic pro-
cedure a myth.2 And every labor-baiter can cite the pro-
vision of the Musicians' Union constitution that:
"The president may annul and set aside the constitu-
tion, by-laws, standing resolutions, or any portion
thereof, excepting such which treat with the finances
of the organization, and substitute therefor other and
different provisions of his own making; the power to
do so is hereby made absolute in the president when,
in his opinion, such orders are necessary to safeguard
the interests of the federation, the locals, members..."
* 3rd Year Law Student, Duke University; A.B. Duke University
1949.
1 A union member is bound to subordinate, within certain limits,
his own judgment to that standard of conduct which the membership
shall have agreed to be for the best interest of all. Rhodes Bros. Co. v.
Musician's Protective Union, 37 R.I. 281, 92 Atl. 641 (1915); Andoroff
v. Building Trades Employers' Ass'n., 83 Ind.App. 294, 148 N.E. 203
(1925); Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union No. 460 of International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of Cedar Rapids, 226 Iowa 191,
284 N.W. 126, 129 (1939); Porter v. King County Medical Society, 58
P.2d 367 (Wash. 1936). See: Pierson, The Government of Trade Unions,
1 INDUsT. & LAB. REL. RV. 593 (1948).
2 Louis Stark, Democracy- and Responsibiity- In Unions, New
York Times Magazine, May 25, 1947, p. 11.
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But it is error to infer from a few isolated instances, that
the membership has no voice in the formulation of union
policy. It has been said that "The ultimate control over
collective bargaining in most unions rests with the rank
and file." This is true of all steps from the formulation of
demands to the final approval of the contract.3 And some
writers have argued that many unions suffer from an excess
of democracy which leads to uneconomic and extreme de-
mands due to the pressure of the membership, rather than,
as is commonly believed, due to their leaders' misguided
thinking.4
In discussing the government of trade-unions, the writer
has focused on factors central to the success or failure of
the organization-disciplinary action, elections, and mem-
bership policies.
L Disciplinary Procedures
In the most detailed analysis of union discipline that has
been found, Professor Summers states that a survey of
154 international unions shows a striking similarity in the
steps to be used in any discipline case.5 The typical pro-
cedure includes the making of charges by a fellow member,
serving of notice on the accused, naming of a trial commit-
tee, holding of a hearing, reporting of recommendations to
the local union for a vote, and appeal from the local to the
international officers and international convention. Some-
times the procedure is enmeshed in a maze of rules, in one
instance covered by about 4000 words (Musicians' Union) ;
in other cases, by a short phrase in the union constitution
simply stating that a fair hearing must be held by the local.
Clearly, if the union constitution provides for certain
procedures, and in the absence of a waiver by the individual
affected, the constitution would seem to create a contractual
Shister, The Locus of Union Control in Collective Bargaining, 60
Quarterly Journal of Economics 545 (1946).
SLICHTER, UNION PoLicIEs AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT, pp. 374ff
(Brookings Institution, 1941).
See generally on disciplinary procedures: Summers, Disciplinary
Procedures of Unions, 4 Indust. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 15 (1950).
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right to that. procedure. Every member in entering the
union has assumed certain obligations under the union con-
stitution, but in return becomes entitled to certain benefits
as part of the consideration for his entering.6
Even if the union constitution or by-laws contain no pro-
vision relative to a hearing, it seems that the courts will
compel the union to afford an adequate procedure7 Accord-
ingly any by-law dispensing with notice is universally held
to be null and void.8 Some courts rest this on natural justice
and public policy. Others announce that .it is implied as a
term of the union constitution on the theory that the union
constitution was intended to regulate rights among the
members in accord with certain fundamental concepts of
proper procedure. 9
The notice required in a hearing must be specific; a copy
of the charges must accompany the notice and be served
within a reasonable time before trial so that the defendant
may properly prepare himself, obtain counsel, and summon
witnesses.10 Without such notice or where the notice is de-
ficient in a vital respect such as time or place of hearing,
there is no jurisdiction to try a member in absentia." The
defendant may waive notice and voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the trial committee.12 Yet even a voluntary
appearance does not deny him the right to have a copy of
the charges.13
6 U'Renn v. Great Northern R. Co., 139 Wash. 366, 247 Pac. 726
(1926).
7International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North
America v. Smith, 145 Texas 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946).
a Ibid.
9 Ibid.
20 Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 73 N.J.L. 729, 65
Atl. 165 (1906); Manning v. Kennedy, 320 IllApp. 11, 49 N.E.2d 658
(1943).
Fritz v. Knaud, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y.S. 1003 (1907).
"Bush v. International Alliance of Theater Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators of United States and Canada, 55
Cal.App.2d 357, 130 P.2d 788 (1942).
23 Brennan v. United Hatters, etc., supra, n. 10.
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According to Summers' survey, slightly less than half
of the unions provide that a hearing board shall consist of
elected officers; the other half stipulate that temporary
committees are to be appointed to hear each case as it arises.
Some unions expressly exclude from these committees, gen-
erally consisting of five to seven members, any biased indi-
viduals. Others have them selected by lot from the mem-
bership at large. To the writer, it seems that a more prefer-
able manner would be to create a permanent trial committee
of elected officers with the defendant having the right
peremptorily to challenge any member of the trial board.
In the event that some or even all of the members become
disqualified, the committee would then be drawn by lot
from the membership of the local, with either side having
the right to challenge for bias.
Provisions in union constitutions for the regulation and
conduct of the hearings are scarce and incomplete, many
having none whatsoever. Very few constitutions guar-
antee the right of counsel. Only rarely does the constitution
permit legal counsel, the otherwise uniform requirement
being that counsel must be chosen from the membership.
One union goes so far as to provide that "the member se-
lected shall not be a lawyer."
Obviously, there is need for legal guidance in the conduct
of disciplinary hearings, as in the admission or exclusion
of hearsay testimony. The appointment of a legal officer
to the trial committee for the limited purpose of rendering
advice on questions of law should be required. He would
have no vote and would not be qualified if'he were the accuser
or a witness for the prosecution or had acted in any investi-
gative or consultative capacity in that case. The defendant
should be permitted to have legal counsel where serious
charges are involved, such as expulsion; in all other in-
stances being restricted to counsel chosen from the mem-
bership.
A majority of unions provide that the trial committee
report its decision of guilt or innocence to the membership
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at large for their approval. Other unions give finality to
the committee determination, while a very small minority
eliminate the trial board entirely and permit the member-
ship to hear evidence firsthand. The first method offers
potentialities of mob rule, as does the last. A more equitable
procedure would seem to require that the committee de-
termination be final, unless the defendant appeals it to the
higher union authorities as set forth in the union constitu-
tion and by-laws.
Professor Chafee, in an article written twenty years ago,
established three possibilities as the basis of an appeal to
the courts from a union disciplinary proceeding. 14 These
were: (1) That the action sounds in contract, the constitu-
tion and by-laws of a union being in effect a contract be-
tween the union and its members; (2) that the action is one
for the protection of property rights (right in union funds,
in one's job, etc.) ; and (3) that the action is one in tort,
the status as a union member and the right to work being
protected from wilful or malicious injury. Most of the
cases in which the courts have received an appeal seem to
assume that the action is in contract; namely, that a wrong-
ful expulsion is a breach of the union's implied promise to
maintain the member's standing so long as he respects union
rules. 15
Exhaustion of remedies is a typical requirement in assail-
ing administrative action and many unions erect a similar
requirement for protesting actions of a local. Accordingly,
under many union constitutions the worker cannot appeal to
the courts until he has exhausted his internal remedies. In
addition to exhaustion of remedies, the International Typo-
graphical Union orders the deposit of a bond to cover the
costs entailed by the union's defense of the action.a These
21 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 48
HARv. L. REv. 993 (1930).
Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Leo v. Local
Union No. 612, International Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wash.2d
498, 174 P.2d 523 (1946).
26 ITU, By-laws Art. IV, sec. 43.
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provisions reflect the long established fear and hatred of
court intervention in labor disputes.' 7
The same rule is applicable to unions as to other volun-
tary organizations, i.e., that persons who join a union are
reasonably chargeable with notice of the membership obli-
gations and duties which the constitution and by-laws im-
pose.18 In the absence of special circumstances, such as
a violation of contract obligations or an invasion of property
rights, the courts will not interfere with intra-association
affairs or determinations of labor unions. 19 Under this
holding, the courts have upheld constitutional -provisions
requiring exhaustion of remedies within the union.20
Nevertheless, the courts have found grounds for juris-
diction in the following cases: where there is either no
appeal within the union procedure or that which exists is
unreasonable ;21 where an appeal might involve too great
17 Examples of court decisions reflecting the courts' antipathy to
labor may be found in 45 Yale L.J. 1248, 1266 (1936). This attitude was
revealed by Samuel Gompers at a legislative hearing where, in answer
to a question referring to the high fines imposed by labor unions for
various offenses (fines which Gompers had already admitted were
equivalent to expulsion), Gompers stated, "God save labor from the
courts!"
Q. "You think that labor unions should be permitted to exercise
this autocratic and despotic power of capital punishment without any
say by the courts?"
Joint Leg. Committee on Housing Rep. Lockwood Committee, (1923).
Leg. Doc. No. 48.
IS Liggett v. Koivuen, 227 Minn. 114, 34 N.W.2d 345 (1948).
29 Green v. Obergfall, 73 App.D.C. 298, 121 F.2d 46 (1941), cert.
denied 314 U.S. 637; Pfoh v. Whitney, 62 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio, 1945);
DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 187
P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 876.
' Greenwood v. Building Trades Council of Sacramento, 71 Cal.App.
159, 233 Pac. 923 (1925); Joel v. Rosseter, 15 Fed.Supp. 914 (1936);
Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 17 N.E.2d 170 (1937); Mayer v.
Journeyman's Stone Cutters Association, 47 N.J.Eq. 519, 20 AtI. 492
(1890); Federation of Insurance Employees v. United Office and Pro-
fessional Workers of America, C.I.O., 74 A.2d 446 (R.I., 1950); Local
1140, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America v.
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 51 A.L.C.
61 (Minn. 1950).
a Local No. 7 v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S.D. Texas 1922); Local No.
11 v. McKee, 114 N.J.Eq. 555, 169 Atl. 351 (1933); Mursener v. Forte,
186 Ore. 253, 205 P.2d 568, 576 (1949).
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a delay; 22 where the case has obviously been prejudged by
the appellate body ;23 where property rights are said to be
involved ;24 where the action appealed from was in gross
excess of authority or in violation of constitutional provi-
sions;25 or where the action appealed from controverted
public policy. 26
A duality of position which makes the same person judge
and prosecutor has long been criticized, and Congress has
seen fit to separate these functions in government agencies
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.27 The
frequent identity of the union's executive and judicial board
means that if charges are brought by the executive board,
the same body that initiated the prosecution will render the
judgment. If the board is dominated by the president, its
judicial power of expulsion can be used for political pur-
poses.
Such domination permits those in power to invoke the
tribunal's powers against hostile members in addition to
2 Bailey v. Montgomery, 177 App.Div. 777, 165 N.Y.S. 159 (1917);
Local 104 v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 158 Wash.
480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930); Washington Local Lodge No. 104, of Inter-
national Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers
of American v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship
Builders and Helpers of America, 33 Wash.2d 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949);
O'Neill v. United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters
of United States and Canada, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944); c. Trainer
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of United States and Canada, 353 Pa. 487,
46 A.2d 463 (1946).
Edmington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S.E. 403 (1929).
24 Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 112 N.J.Eq. 593, 177 Atl. 102 (1935); Cook
v. John H. Mathias, 61 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1948); Minn. Council of State
Employees, No. 19 v. American Federation of State, County, and Munici-
pay Employees, 220 Minn. 179, 19 N.W.2d 414 (1945).
= Gilmore.v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y.S. 1 (1919); Gardner v.
Newbert, 74 Ind.App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920); Ellis v. A.F.L., 48 Cal.
App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (1941) ; Barnhart v. United Autimobile Aircrift,
A.I. Workers, 10 N.J.Super. 357, 76 A.2d 270 (1950).
21 Cameron v. International etc. Union No. 384, 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 176
Atl. 692 (1935); Oakes, Law of Organized Labor and Industrial Con.
ficts (1927).
" Federal Administrative Procedure Act, sec. 5(c); For history and
discussion of sec. 5(c), see: Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, Attorney-
General, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Labor-Management 'Relations Act, 1947,
sec. 3(d).
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preventing those members from invoking the tribunal's
power against the administration. This second factor be-
comes of utmost importance in those unions which provide
penalties for complainant's failure to prove his charges.
In a substantial number of cases union officers are found
sitting in judgment on activities which constitute opposi-
tion to their own policies or power. A typical case arose
where the president introduced to his local a resolution con-
demning the general executive board for signing a contract
with the employer without the required approval of the
membership, and stating that the membership would not be
bound thereby. The same board tried, convicted, and ex-
pelled him, and this action was upheld on the narrow point
that the proceedings had complied with the union consti-
tution.28
In other cases, disciplinary power has been used to purge
opposition.2 9 Sometimes, it has been used by a winning can-
didate to charge the losing candidate with conduct unbe-
coming a union member. In such a case, the expulsion of
the protesting members was nullified by the court, and
their reinstatement ordered. 30 In addition to domination
by the officers, unofficial cliques within the union have used
discipline procedures to satisfy their own whims and
desires. Thus, where an unpopular member had a fictitious
charge lodged against him, and was convicted and expelled,
the court held the action to be improper. 31
Added to political influences, which overentangle disci-
pline with policy making, are the problems created by the
fact that disciplinary proceedings are administered by lay-
28 State ex rel Dame v. Le Fevre, 251 Wise. 146, 28 N.W.2d 349 (1937).
In Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1945), two shop stewards were
expelled on charges brought by officers of the union. They were tried
and found guilty by the executive board, which included the officers
whose orders had been violated and who had filed the charges. The
court ordered the stewards reinstated.
" Malloy v. Carroll, 272 Mass. 524, 172 N.E. 790 (1930); Cameron v.
Durking, 321 Mass. 590, 74 N.E.2d 671 (1947).
O'brien v. Papas, 49 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1944).
Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705 (1944).
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men who are not fully cognizant of the law, but have an his-
toric adversion to everything connected therewith.
Many of the procedural elements which by lawyers are
believed to be essential to a fair trial find little sympathy
with the layman. The layman is impatient to make up
his mind and is impervious to the minute and involved tech-
nicalities used to protect the accused.
In one case, bogus ballots all filled in with the name of
the same candidate were admittedly deposited by the de-
fendant. He insisted they were given him by other mem-
bers, but he was tried, convicted and fined $2500.00. The
conviction was reversed because it was based on a presump-
tion of guilt, the burden having been placed on the defend-
ant to prove himself innocent, and because the winning can-
didate sat on the trial board.32
In another case, the trial was to be held by the interna-
tional executive board of the union. The international pres-
ident ordered the parties to submit their evidence by mail
.since the board members lived at a distance from each other
and the parties. This was held to be improper as denying
the right to confrontation and cross-examination. 83
Closely connected with, yet divisible from the layman's
influence, is the emotional content of many discipline cases.
A charge of union disloyalty or strike-breaking combined
with the anger which the charge itself creates makes a crit-
ical and calm judgment of whether the accused committed
the act difficult. A secession movement will many times
lead to snap-judgment expulsions. Thus, where certain
dissident union members were expelled after calling an
unsuccessful outlaw strike, the appellant was declared not
2 McGintey v. Milk and Ice Cream Salesman, Drivers, and Dairy
Employees Local No. 205, 351 Pa. 47, 40 A.2d 16 (1945).
Koukly v. Weber, 154 Misc. 659, 277 N.Y.S. 39 (1935). In Brooks
v. Engan, 250 App.Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d (1935) the union excluded the
defendant while it heard a witness and refused to let him know the
identity of the witness or the testimony offered. The court held this
to be a denial of a fair trial.
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to have had a fair trial, she having ceased working for the
struck employer two months before the strike.3 4
The political influence, the layman's influence, and the
emotional influence are inescapable in union disciplinary
actions. Many times, some or all of them arise in court
proceedings. The most recent statement of the critical part
emotion can play in a trial was announced by Justice Jack-
son when, in a concurring opinion, he sided with the Court
in reversing a rape conviction on the ground that violent
emotions had been aroused through inflammatory newspaper
articles, and that under such circumstances, a fair trial
could not have been had.3 5
Union disciplinary procedure is in need of revision. An
impartial tribunal with a non-voting legal advisor before
whom the accused could try his case would do much to alle-
viate the problem of politics and emotionalism in the final
decision.
HI. Elections
A recent survey showed that of 167 unions, 83 are re-
quired to hold conventions at least every two years and 109
hold conventions at least every four years.36 If the pro-
cedural test as to the conduct of the elections and conven-
tions is applied to the above statistics, the results take on
a different light. Certain it is that a study of convention
proceedings yields the impression that the leaders of many
unions "are not hesitant about departing from parliamen-
" Sway v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791 (1939) (reinstate-
ment denied on other grounds); cf. Cason v. Glass Blowers Association
of United States and Canada, 220 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1950), where the presi-
dent of a local, having been expelled for not ending an outlaw strike,
was ordered reinstated by the court on the grounds that the proceed-
ings before the national convention were contrary to "natural justice"
and "fair play" in that the plaintiff was not permitted to plead his case
personally before the assembled delegates.
2 Shepherd v. State of Florida, 71 Sup.Ct 549 (1951).
28 Shister, Trade Union Government; A Formal Analysis, 60 Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 91 (1945).
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tary rules where an important issue is up for consideration,
or where their power is seriously threatened. '3 7
Over a period of 31 years, in only nine of 63 elections for
the presidency was there any opposition to the incumbent.38
This apathy of the membership has, in all probability, no
single causative factor. Many times, it would seem not to
be the fault of the union leadership.
In spite of penalties sometimes imposed for non-attend-
ance, in spite of appeals, and in spite of much effort on the
part of some organizations to make their program attract-
ive, the problem of decreasing attendance and participation
in union government grows. High wages and attendant
lack of interest are one cause. Some industries, 'incident to
wartime expansion, hired men who were required to join
a union in order to work, but who were not permanently in
the industry, and therefore did not concern themselves
with union activities.
A major factor is that there are more places to go and
more things to do.3 9 There has been a multiplication of
automobiles, movies, radios, and now television. A larger
expanse of recreational activities is open to the American
worker as the result of his higher wages, so that if the
choice is between a union meeting and a boxing match the
meeting is forgone. More and more the union has been
under the necessity of competing with other institutions
in order to retain the active interest of its members. Yet,
as Millis and Montgomery write, "Notwithstanding the
weakness of union government, union members do partici-
pate much more frequently and effectively in the election of
their leaders and determination of their policies, than the
electors of a city government. Above all they have a more
personal interest in the men and issues, than do the elect-
ors."
4 0
31 Pierson, The Government of Trade Unions, 1 Indust. and Labor Rel.
Rev. 593, 602 (1948).
Is Taft, Opposition to Union Officers in Elections, 58 Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 247 (1944).




The union may use reasonable arguments, peaceable per-
suasion and even entreaty to acquire members.41 But since
the right to join or not to join is a protected one,42 the
unions must depend for their membership upon the free
choice of the individual worker. No resort can be had to
compulsory methods of any kind to increase, keep up, or
retain such membership. 48
These principles are expressly made applicable to inter-
state commerce by the Taft-Hartley Act. Sec. 7 guarantees
employees "the right to refrain" from joining or assisting
a labor organization. Sec. 8(b) (1) states:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organ-
ization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein. . ....
In prohibiting unions from coercing employees into join-
ing, this section reverts to the view of the courts prior to
the Wagner Act. The Board has used as a test to determine
whether the union has unlawfully coerced the employees:
Were the union's statements or actions "reasonably calcu-
lated to coerce" employees in their right not to join a
union and to refrain from concerted activities ? While
the two most common forms of coercion are threats and
violence, the Board has held that in some circumstances
the mere execution of an illegal union security agreement
with an employer-and, a fortiori, its enforcement-consti
' My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 283, 59 Atl. 721 (1905); United
States v. Weber, 114 Fed. 950 (1902).
12 Membership rights in a labor union, as well as rights under the
employment contract, are valuable property rights protected by the 5th
Amendment. Nissen v. International Brotherhood, T.C.S.H., 229 Iowa
1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941).
3Longshore Printing & Publishing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38
Pac. 547 (1894).
11 Seamproofe, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 892 (1949).
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tutes restraint of the employees' right to join or not to join
a union.
4 5
The right of labor unions to make by-laws and rules for
the admission of members is unquestionable; they may
require such qualifications for membership as they choose.40
While labor organizations generally claim to be guided by
the principle of inclusiveness, all workers being welcome
and desired as members, there are exceptions and limita-
tions. It is perfectly competent for them to require
that a certain measure of training have been completed,
this to protect the competency of those entering the trade.47
Notwithstanding that the principle of inclusiveness is
allegedly adhered to, it is frequently departed from by craft
unions and in time of unemployment by many industrial
unions as well. Entrance into the union is sometimes closed,
and in time of depression, dues of the younger members may
be returned and their membership cancelled. The same
type of exclusiveness is sometimes practiced when there is
an overabundance of jobs-an example being during and
after the 1906 earthquake, when the building-trades locals
of San Francisco refused to issue any new cards or to accept
the cards of nearby locals so that double and triple wages
could be earned by their members working overtime and on
Sundays.
Is Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38 (1949); Clara-Val Packing Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949). In the latter case, the union expelled a mem-
ber for refusal to honor a picket line which the union had established
at the plant of another company with whom the union had a labor dis-
pute. The union, in requesting that the ex-member be fired from herjob in accordance with the union-security provisions of the contract,
was held by the Board to be violating sec. 8(b) (1), the contract having
been signed without the election required under sec. 9.
1 Pickette v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 575, 78 N.E. 753 (1906); Wilson v.
Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1950). See: Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944) and Betts v. Easley, 161 Ka. 459, 169 P.2d
831 (1946) for a discussion of racial discrimination in union admission
policies. In Union Starch and Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 51 A.L.C. 184,
C.C.A., 7th Cir., No. 10144, (1951), the discharge of employees was
held invalid when they applied for membership, tendered their fees
and dues, but refused to take a loyalty oath to the union. While a
union may set up membership requirements, it cannot have employees
discharged for any reason other than failure to tender fees and dues.
17 National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E.
369 (1902); Millis & Montgomery, supra, n. 39.
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In return for membership in the union, financial obliga-
tions are undertaken. While the fees and dues, their amount,
and time of payment are ordinarily provided for by the
locals, the internationals, as they gain more power and
assume new functions like newspapers and radio publicity,
have begun to set the fees and dues. More and more they
tend to fix them, or at least fix the minimum, maximum or
both. With a few exceptions, the dues are moderate, such
as $1.00 per month in the Railway Brotherhoods.
Union leaders generally follow the psychology found in
the average business as to prices when it comes to the set-
ting of adequate dues. Some say, the higher the dues, the
more interest is found among the membership, which de-
sires to get its money's worth, in contrast to low dues where
the member believes he is getting something for nothing
and takes no interest. High dues also lead to a stable and
sound financial organization capable of dealing with the
employer on a more equitable footing and of going through
a strike without too great a retrenchment.
In addition to regulating the dues of the local, the inter-
national must consider that its financial stability depends
upon the money received by the local inasmuch as it collects
a percentage of the dues paid in. However, in recent years,
in order to eliminate the risk of depending upon dues col-
lected from the members-a hand-to-mouth type of exist-
ence-many parent unions have found it a better policy to
levy a per capita tax on each local.
Insofar as dues and fees are concerned, the Taft-Hartley
Act reads as follows:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organ-
ization or its agents- to require of employees cover-
ed by an agreement authorized under subsection (a)
(3) the payment, as a condition precedent to becom-
ing a member of such organization, of a fee in an
amount which the Board finds excessive or discrimi-
nating under all the circumstances. In making such a
finding, the Board shall consider, among the relevant
factors, the practices and customs of labor organiza-
tions in the particular industry, and wages currently
paid to the employees affected . . ." Sec. 8 (b) (5).
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This restriction, while generally believed to apply to all
unions, applies only to those covered by a union-shop
agreement. It is intended to keep unions from forcing
employees out of their jobs by making initiation fees so
high that they cannot join, and thus legitimately be dis-
charged under the act for "non-payment of fees. '48
Conclusion
Disciplinary actions are generally carried out in a fair
and just manner, the cases getting into the courts being
unrepresentative. One overall factor to be considered in
the remedy of the judicial procedure is that there is no
local procedure outlined in the constitution of the inter-
national union; the executive board of the international
union in passing upon the by-laws of the local should make
certain that proper judicial machinery has been provided.
Elections are held and regularly so. While it is true that
abuses take place, possibly more so than is usually found
in a governing body, it is believed that such is the result of
the failure of younger men and women to make their life
in the governing portion of the union movement. As is
the case with politics, the rewards seem to be insufficient
for the amount of work and sacrifice required, and thus we
see the more capable among younger people going into the
highly-touted "white-collar" field. How many newly-grad-
uated lawyers are willing to be ostracized from their com-
munities in order to become union lawyers?
The solution to the problem presented by misgovernment
or lack of proper government in any self-governing body,
be it an unincorporated association such as a labor union
or a political entity, will not be afforded by the application
of restrictive legislation which would crush their auto-
nomous nature. Rather, it lies in the educating and propa-
gandizing of the constituencies of the bodies involved, so
that they will seek through their own efforts to secure an
improvement in their internal procedures.
8 93 Cong. Record 6443, June 5, 1947. See: Union Starch and Re-
finding Co., etc., supra, n. 46.
